February 20, 2007
Will Embarrassing the President Make Us Safer?
By Ed Koch
Over the last few years I have written of my fears that we Americans, as a people, have lost our will to fight for our freedom.
We have come to expect that wars can be fought without casualties, even the relatively modest casualties we have suffered in Iraq. During World War Two, more Americans were killed or wounded on Iwo Jima in one month than have fallen in Iraq in almost four years. Of course, every military death and severe injury is a tragedy. Nevertheless, former Secretary of State Colin Powell has said that our army in Iraq is "about broken," which appalled and frightened me.
Added to those two disturbing dangers to our national security is a new and third factor: denial of a military threat to our armed forces. Such a denial allows us to avoid addressing the threat with an appropriate military response.
We are not at war with Iran, but Iran seems to be at war with us. In the last year we have suffered at least 170 American military deaths in Iraq and 640 American soldiers have been injured as a result of Iranian manufactured and supplied explosives supplied to Iraqi insurgents and terrorists. These explosives are planted at the side of the road and are activated when U.S. military vehicles pass by. They are especially dangerous because their high technology design allows them to penetrate armored vehicles and kill and maim the occupants.
All American leaders, including the President, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, agree that these weapons are manufactured in Iran. They are provided to Iraqi insurgents and terrorists by an Iranian military unit known as the Quds Force. What we are not able to state with certainty is whether, according to The New York Times, "senior leaders of Iran's government are directly involved in the attacks."
The Times states, "Based on evidence gathered inside Iraq, American intelligence analysts have concluded that a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps known as the Quds Force is supplying Shiite groups with Iranian-designed weapons, called explosively formed penetrators."
The Times reported, "Because the Quds Force, which operates outside Iran, has historically fallen under the command of Iran's senior religious leaders, intelligence agencies have concluded that top leaders in Tehran are directing the attacks."
General Peter Pace is quoted in The Times as saying "that American forces had confirmed that some bomb materials found inside Iraq were made in Iran, but 'that does not translate that the Iranian government per se, for sure, is directly involved in doing this.'"
The Times points out the [Iranian revolutionary] "Guard has also been accused of supporting terrorist attacks outside Iran, notably the 1996 truck bomb attack on the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 American service members. In December, a federal judge ruled that the government of Iran bore responsibility for the Khobar Towers attack and ordered Tehran to pay survivors of those killed more than $253 million."
So what do we know with certainty? There are those in Iran, on a significant scale, supplying Iraqi insurgents and terrorists with deadly bombs responsible for killing and injuring 820 American soldiers in the last year. Is it reasonable to believe that is possible without the approval of sectors of the Iranian government? I refer to the civil government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the theocratic and supreme government of the religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the dominant government official.
In dictatorships where dissidents seek to engage in activities prohibited by the state, those so engaged usually end up on the gallows. They are enemies of the state. It is beyond the realm of common sense to believe the Iranian government is aware of the supply activity as it is, the U.S. having made it public on several occasions, and is neither actively or passively, and knowledgably engaged in that activity. In fascist, Nazi, communist, theocratic and totalitarian states that extensively control the lives and political conduct of their citizens, there is very little crime, and practically zero crime against the state.
The Times reports why the Iranian government is engaging in this kind of behavior, writing, "Still American intelligence agencies have concluded that over the past year the Iranian government had adopted a new policy of directly confronting the United States inside Iraq. The policy officials assess is aimed partly at raising the cost of American involvement in the Middle East, teaching the Bush administration a lesson about the cost of regime change and putting pressure on American forces to leave.
"But another reason, they say, is to dissuade the Bush administration from taking a more confrontational policy toward Tehran by sending a message that Iran can ratchet up the attacks on American forces in Iraq."
It appears that Iran has succeeded in staring us down and preventing us from taking appropriate military action to protect our troops and punish those seeking to harm them. Iran will not be required to pay a price because our army is "about broken" and is not capable of responding. How awful and unnerving for the U.S., the sole remaining superpower in the world.
Democrats and some Republicans in Congress are seeking to humble, embarrass and, if they can, destroy the President and the prestige of his position as the Commander-in-Chief who is responsible for the safety of our military forces and the nation's defenses. By doing so, they are adding to the dangers that face our nation.
And so I ask again them again: do you think that leaving a power vacuum in Iraq will make us safer? If, as a result of the power vacuum, the terrorists are emboldened and God forbid we sustain here in the U.S. civilian casualties comparable to those caused in Iraq by car bombs, will you publicly accept responsibility?
Ed Koch is the former Mayor of New York City.
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Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 20, 2007
Tuesday, February 13, 2007
AP: al-Sadr flees Iraq for Iran
Anti-American cleric flees Iraq for Iran
By ANNE GEARAN, AP Diplomatic Writer
20 minutes ago
Anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr fled Iraq for Iran ahead of a security crackdown in Baghdad and the arrival of 21,500 U.S. troops sent by President Bush to quell sectarian violence, a senior U.S. official said Tuesday.
Al-Sadr left his Baghdad stronghold some weeks ago, the official said, and is believed to be in Tehran, where he has family. The official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss U.S. monitoring activities, said fractures in al-Sadr's political and militia operations may be part of the reason for his departure. The move is not believed to be permanent, the official said.
Word of al-Sadr's departure coincides with an announcement that Iraq will close its borders with Iran and Syria for 72 hours as part of the drive to end the violence that has threatened to divide the capital along sectarian lines.
The U.S. official said it is not clear how firmly the radical Shiite cleric is controlling his organization and the associated Mahdi Army militia from exile.
"The question for us is to what extent his organization is going to participate in the political process," the official said, referring to al-Sadr's on-again, off-again relationship with the fragile democratic government in Baghdad.
Al-Sadr's departure was reported by several television networks Tuesday.
Al-Sadr's militia is widely seen as the main threat to Iraq's unity and high on the list of targets for the Baghdad security operation.
A ragtag but highly motivated militia that fought U.S. forces twice in 2004, the Mahdi Army is blamed for much of the sectarian strife shaking Iraq since a Shiite shrine was bombed by Sunni militants a year ago. U.S. officials have for months pressed Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to move against the militia, but he has so far done little to comply, largely because he does not want to lose al-Sadr's support.
Al-Sadr rose from obscurity in the aftermath of the ouster of Saddam Hussein to lead a movement of young, underprivileged Iraqis united by opposition to U.S. military presence as well as hunger for Shiite domination.
The cleric, who is in his mid-30s, is a master of street politics, and his young lieutenants can rally tens of thousands of protesters at short notice. Once wanted in the 2003 killing of a key cleric, al-Sadr gained much influence when his parliamentary bloc of 30 of 275 deputies was instrumental in al-Maliki's election.
Dismissed by older Shiite politicians as a dangerous upstart, al-Sadr set up the Mahdi Army militia in 2003. It is suspected of being behind the abduction and murder of thousands of Sunnis in what are known as death squad killings.
Two key members of al-Sadr's political and military organization were gunned down last week, the latest of as many as seven key figures in the al-Sadr organization killed or captured in the past two months.
The deaths and captures came after al-Maliki, also a Shiite, dropped his protection for the organization.
Shiite leaders insist that the Shiite militias flourished because the U.S. and its allies could not protect civilians. They say if the Sunni insurgents were crushed, the threat from Shiite hard-liners would go away.
Shiite politicians have long maintained that Sunni militants pose a greater threat to Iraq's stability. Thousands of Shiite civilians have been killed in bombings and suicide attacks carried out by al-Qaida in Iraq and other Sunni groups.
Thousands regularly cross the porous Iraq-Iran border, and Iran has been a popular destination for elite Shiite Iraq exiles. In Saddam's time those exiles included al-Maliki, who like other educated and politically active Shiites feared for his safety in Iraq.
By ANNE GEARAN, AP Diplomatic Writer
20 minutes ago
Anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr fled Iraq for Iran ahead of a security crackdown in Baghdad and the arrival of 21,500 U.S. troops sent by President Bush to quell sectarian violence, a senior U.S. official said Tuesday.
Al-Sadr left his Baghdad stronghold some weeks ago, the official said, and is believed to be in Tehran, where he has family. The official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss U.S. monitoring activities, said fractures in al-Sadr's political and militia operations may be part of the reason for his departure. The move is not believed to be permanent, the official said.
Word of al-Sadr's departure coincides with an announcement that Iraq will close its borders with Iran and Syria for 72 hours as part of the drive to end the violence that has threatened to divide the capital along sectarian lines.
The U.S. official said it is not clear how firmly the radical Shiite cleric is controlling his organization and the associated Mahdi Army militia from exile.
"The question for us is to what extent his organization is going to participate in the political process," the official said, referring to al-Sadr's on-again, off-again relationship with the fragile democratic government in Baghdad.
Al-Sadr's departure was reported by several television networks Tuesday.
Al-Sadr's militia is widely seen as the main threat to Iraq's unity and high on the list of targets for the Baghdad security operation.
A ragtag but highly motivated militia that fought U.S. forces twice in 2004, the Mahdi Army is blamed for much of the sectarian strife shaking Iraq since a Shiite shrine was bombed by Sunni militants a year ago. U.S. officials have for months pressed Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to move against the militia, but he has so far done little to comply, largely because he does not want to lose al-Sadr's support.
Al-Sadr rose from obscurity in the aftermath of the ouster of Saddam Hussein to lead a movement of young, underprivileged Iraqis united by opposition to U.S. military presence as well as hunger for Shiite domination.
The cleric, who is in his mid-30s, is a master of street politics, and his young lieutenants can rally tens of thousands of protesters at short notice. Once wanted in the 2003 killing of a key cleric, al-Sadr gained much influence when his parliamentary bloc of 30 of 275 deputies was instrumental in al-Maliki's election.
Dismissed by older Shiite politicians as a dangerous upstart, al-Sadr set up the Mahdi Army militia in 2003. It is suspected of being behind the abduction and murder of thousands of Sunnis in what are known as death squad killings.
Two key members of al-Sadr's political and military organization were gunned down last week, the latest of as many as seven key figures in the al-Sadr organization killed or captured in the past two months.
The deaths and captures came after al-Maliki, also a Shiite, dropped his protection for the organization.
Shiite leaders insist that the Shiite militias flourished because the U.S. and its allies could not protect civilians. They say if the Sunni insurgents were crushed, the threat from Shiite hard-liners would go away.
Shiite politicians have long maintained that Sunni militants pose a greater threat to Iraq's stability. Thousands of Shiite civilians have been killed in bombings and suicide attacks carried out by al-Qaida in Iraq and other Sunni groups.
Thousands regularly cross the porous Iraq-Iran border, and Iran has been a popular destination for elite Shiite Iraq exiles. In Saddam's time those exiles included al-Maliki, who like other educated and politically active Shiites feared for his safety in Iraq.
Friday, January 19, 2007
Buchanan: "See the Superpower Run"
January 19, 2007
See the Superpower Run
By Patrick Buchanan
No sooner had Sens. Hagel and Biden announced their resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Bush surge of 21,500 troops to Iraq was not in the national interest than the stampede was on. By day's end, Sens. Dodd, Clinton, Bayh, Levin and Obama and ex-Sen. John Edwards had all made or issued statements calling for reversing course or getting out.
You can't run a war by committee, said Vice President Cheney.
True. George Washington did not request a vote of confidence from the Continental Congress before crossing the Delaware, and Douglas MacArthur did not consult Capitol Hill before landing at Inchon.
But Congress is not trying to run a war. Congress is trying to get out of Iraq and get on record opposing the "surge." Congress is running after popular opinion.
And if the surge does not succeed in six months in quelling the sectarian violence in Baghdad, there will be no more troops, and the Americans will start down the road to Kuwait. And, unlike 2003, there will be no embedded and exhilarated journalists riding with them.
To the older generation, the American way of abandonment is familiar. JFK's New Frontiersmen marched us, flags flying, into Vietnam. But, as the body count rose to 200 a week, the "Best and Brightest" suddenly discovered this was a "civil war," "Nixon's war" and the Saigon regime was "corrupt and dictatorial." So, with a clean conscience, they cut off funds and averted their gaze as Pol Pot's holocaust ensued.
Our Vietnamese friends who did not make it out on the choppers, or survive the hellish crossing of the South China Sea by raft, wound up shot in the street or sent to "re-education camps."
Nouri al-Maliki can see what is coming.
As Condi flies about the Middle East in a security bubble, telling the press he is living on "borrowed time," and Bush tells PBS of his revulsion at the botched hanging of Saddam Hussein, Maliki is showing the same signs of independence he demonstrated when he refused Bush's invitation to dine with him and the king of Jordan. Give me the guns and equipment and go home, he seems to be saying to the White House.
Put me down on Maliki's side. It is he who is taking the real risk here -- with his life. It is he who is likely to learn what Kissinger meant when he observed that in this world, while it is often dangerous to be an enemy of the United States, to be a friend is fatal.
Will the surge work? Can it work? Certainly, adding thousands of the toughest cops in America to the LAPD would reduce gang violence in South Central. So, it may work for a time.
Yet in the long run it is hard to see how the surge succeeds. We are four years into this war, and the bloodletting in Baghdad is rising. Our presence has never been more resented. In America, the war has already been lost. Even Bush admits that staying the course means "slow failure." And a rapid withdrawal, as urged by the Baker-Hamilton commission, means "expedited failure."
Even should the surge succeed for a time, it may only push the inevitable into another year.
And consider what it is we are asking Maliki to do.
We want him to use Sunni and Kurdish brigades of the Iraqi Army, in concert with the U.S. Army, to smash the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr, the most popular Shia leader in the country and the principal political support of Maliki. We are asking Maliki to turn on his ruthless Shia patron and bet his future on an America whose people want all U.S. troops home, the earlier the better.
For Maliki to implement fully the U.S. conditions would make him a mortal enemy of Moqtada and millions of Shia, and possibly result in his assassination. Whatever legacy Bush faces, he is not staring down a gun barrel at that.
The truth: There is only one U.S. policy guaranteed to work if we are resolved to keep Iraq in the U.S. camp. That is to send an army of 500,000 to 750,000 U.S. troops into Iraq for an indefinite period, to pacify Baghdad, retake and hold Anbar and secure the borders against jihadis. Even that kind of commitment, beyond the present capacity of the U.S. Army and Marines, would not secure America's position, once the inevitable withdrawal began.
It is over. What we need to face now are the consequence of the folly of Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice in launching this unnecessary and unprovoked war, the folly of the neocon snake oil salesmen who bamboozled the media into believing in this insane crusade to bring democracy to Baghdad in the belly of Bradley fighting vehicles and the folly of the Democratic establishment in handing Bush a blank check for war out of political fear of being called unpatriotic.
Copyright 2007 Creators Syndicate
See the Superpower Run
By Patrick Buchanan
No sooner had Sens. Hagel and Biden announced their resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Bush surge of 21,500 troops to Iraq was not in the national interest than the stampede was on. By day's end, Sens. Dodd, Clinton, Bayh, Levin and Obama and ex-Sen. John Edwards had all made or issued statements calling for reversing course or getting out.
You can't run a war by committee, said Vice President Cheney.
True. George Washington did not request a vote of confidence from the Continental Congress before crossing the Delaware, and Douglas MacArthur did not consult Capitol Hill before landing at Inchon.
But Congress is not trying to run a war. Congress is trying to get out of Iraq and get on record opposing the "surge." Congress is running after popular opinion.
And if the surge does not succeed in six months in quelling the sectarian violence in Baghdad, there will be no more troops, and the Americans will start down the road to Kuwait. And, unlike 2003, there will be no embedded and exhilarated journalists riding with them.
To the older generation, the American way of abandonment is familiar. JFK's New Frontiersmen marched us, flags flying, into Vietnam. But, as the body count rose to 200 a week, the "Best and Brightest" suddenly discovered this was a "civil war," "Nixon's war" and the Saigon regime was "corrupt and dictatorial." So, with a clean conscience, they cut off funds and averted their gaze as Pol Pot's holocaust ensued.
Our Vietnamese friends who did not make it out on the choppers, or survive the hellish crossing of the South China Sea by raft, wound up shot in the street or sent to "re-education camps."
Nouri al-Maliki can see what is coming.
As Condi flies about the Middle East in a security bubble, telling the press he is living on "borrowed time," and Bush tells PBS of his revulsion at the botched hanging of Saddam Hussein, Maliki is showing the same signs of independence he demonstrated when he refused Bush's invitation to dine with him and the king of Jordan. Give me the guns and equipment and go home, he seems to be saying to the White House.
Put me down on Maliki's side. It is he who is taking the real risk here -- with his life. It is he who is likely to learn what Kissinger meant when he observed that in this world, while it is often dangerous to be an enemy of the United States, to be a friend is fatal.
Will the surge work? Can it work? Certainly, adding thousands of the toughest cops in America to the LAPD would reduce gang violence in South Central. So, it may work for a time.
Yet in the long run it is hard to see how the surge succeeds. We are four years into this war, and the bloodletting in Baghdad is rising. Our presence has never been more resented. In America, the war has already been lost. Even Bush admits that staying the course means "slow failure." And a rapid withdrawal, as urged by the Baker-Hamilton commission, means "expedited failure."
Even should the surge succeed for a time, it may only push the inevitable into another year.
And consider what it is we are asking Maliki to do.
We want him to use Sunni and Kurdish brigades of the Iraqi Army, in concert with the U.S. Army, to smash the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr, the most popular Shia leader in the country and the principal political support of Maliki. We are asking Maliki to turn on his ruthless Shia patron and bet his future on an America whose people want all U.S. troops home, the earlier the better.
For Maliki to implement fully the U.S. conditions would make him a mortal enemy of Moqtada and millions of Shia, and possibly result in his assassination. Whatever legacy Bush faces, he is not staring down a gun barrel at that.
The truth: There is only one U.S. policy guaranteed to work if we are resolved to keep Iraq in the U.S. camp. That is to send an army of 500,000 to 750,000 U.S. troops into Iraq for an indefinite period, to pacify Baghdad, retake and hold Anbar and secure the borders against jihadis. Even that kind of commitment, beyond the present capacity of the U.S. Army and Marines, would not secure America's position, once the inevitable withdrawal began.
It is over. What we need to face now are the consequence of the folly of Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice in launching this unnecessary and unprovoked war, the folly of the neocon snake oil salesmen who bamboozled the media into believing in this insane crusade to bring democracy to Baghdad in the belly of Bradley fighting vehicles and the folly of the Democratic establishment in handing Bush a blank check for war out of political fear of being called unpatriotic.
Copyright 2007 Creators Syndicate
Friday, January 12, 2007
For the Bush plan: Owens
Why Bush's war plan can work
The key to achieving a unified, self-governing Iraq is providing security for the Iraqi people.
By Mackubin Thomas Owens
NEWPORT, R.I.
The strategy that the president outlined Wednesday night does not represent an altogether new approach to Iraq, but a necessary adaptation of the previous strategy to changed circumstances. It is, in effect, an updating of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq he issued in November 2005.
President Bush's prime-time address acknowledged the shortcomings of past efforts to secure Baghdad. And he implied that this new effort to do so represents a final opportunity to salvage victory in Iraq. Failure in Iraq, he warned, would be a disaster. But Mr. Bush's plan can work.
Strategy is the interplay of ends, ways, and means. Strategic thinking implies limited means. There are never enough resources to achieve all goals, so choices must be made concerning how best to apply limited resources.
In the case of Iraq, America's strategic goal is a "unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror." The key to achieving this strategic goal is to provide security for the Iraqi people. This, in turn, requires defeating the insurgents.
Until February of last year, the key to victory was the defeat of the Sunni insurgency centered in Anbar Province. This took the form of a campaign to destroy the Sunni insurgency by depriving it of its base in the Sunni Triangle and its "ratlines" - the infiltration routes that run from the Syrian border into the heart of Iraq. The operational concept was "clear and hold."
No force can continue to fight if it is deprived of sanctuary and logistics support. Accordingly, the central goal of the US strategy before February 2006 was to destroy the ratlines following the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.
This campaign began in November 2004 with the takedown of Fallujah. Wresting Fallujah from the jihadis was critically important: Control of the town had given them crucial infrastructure to attack Iraqi and coalition targets.
The loss of Fallujah didn't cause the insurgency to collapse, but it did deprive the rebels of an indispensable sanctuary.
The coalition continued a high tempo of offensive operations. Although successful in many respects, these operations seemed like the "Whac-A-Mole" arcade game: towns were cleared of insurgents, but because of limited manpower, they could not be held. Insurgents returned once coalition forces moved on.
In February 2006, when Sunni extremists destroyed the Shiite mosque in Samarra, sectarian violence exploded, especially in Baghdad. American and Iraqi troops had to redeploy to confront the new threat, and in doing so, the gains that had been achieved against the Sunni insurgents were lost.
The new plan is a response to these changing conditions. The main reason for the so-called surge is to provide enough troops to provide security for Baghdad while regaining the initiative against the Sunni fighters in Anbar. It also recognizes that the Shiite militias causing most of the deaths in Baghdad must be neutralized.
It includes not only a military component but political and economic elements, as well. The adage - to defeat an insurgency, "win the hearts and minds" of the people - is true. But to do that, the people must have security. And to achieve security, it is often necessary to kill and capture the insurgents. Thus, military success is a necessary, if not sufficient, cause for defeating an insurgency.
This point is illustrated by an objective analysis of the Vietnam War. As Mark Moyar demonstrates in his remarkable new book, "Triumph Forsaken," the government of Ngo Dinh Diem had broken the communist insurgency in South Vietnam by 1960 by killing and capturing communist cadres in unprecedented number, leading many survivors to defect to the government's side. And in his book, "A Better War," Lewis Sorley shows how the US did the same in the late 1960s and 1970s.
Will Bush's approach work? This depends on at least three factors. The first is the adequacy of the force. Many commentators have called for troop increases of 40,000 to 50,000, but 20,000, which Bush called for, is the maximum number that can be culled from the current force. In any case, the key to success is not the number of troops but how they are used.
The second factor is the Iraqi government. Until now, the Shiite militias have been off limits. That has to change, and Bush put Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on notice that this is the case.
The third factor is Congress. Would the Democrats rather see Bush lose or the US win? Let us hope that the Demo-crats take the wise counsel of one of their own, Sen. Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, who reminded us the other day that the stark choice in Iraq is between victory and defeat.
• Mackubin Thomas Owens is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own
The key to achieving a unified, self-governing Iraq is providing security for the Iraqi people.
By Mackubin Thomas Owens
NEWPORT, R.I.
The strategy that the president outlined Wednesday night does not represent an altogether new approach to Iraq, but a necessary adaptation of the previous strategy to changed circumstances. It is, in effect, an updating of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq he issued in November 2005.
President Bush's prime-time address acknowledged the shortcomings of past efforts to secure Baghdad. And he implied that this new effort to do so represents a final opportunity to salvage victory in Iraq. Failure in Iraq, he warned, would be a disaster. But Mr. Bush's plan can work.
Strategy is the interplay of ends, ways, and means. Strategic thinking implies limited means. There are never enough resources to achieve all goals, so choices must be made concerning how best to apply limited resources.
In the case of Iraq, America's strategic goal is a "unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror." The key to achieving this strategic goal is to provide security for the Iraqi people. This, in turn, requires defeating the insurgents.
Until February of last year, the key to victory was the defeat of the Sunni insurgency centered in Anbar Province. This took the form of a campaign to destroy the Sunni insurgency by depriving it of its base in the Sunni Triangle and its "ratlines" - the infiltration routes that run from the Syrian border into the heart of Iraq. The operational concept was "clear and hold."
No force can continue to fight if it is deprived of sanctuary and logistics support. Accordingly, the central goal of the US strategy before February 2006 was to destroy the ratlines following the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.
This campaign began in November 2004 with the takedown of Fallujah. Wresting Fallujah from the jihadis was critically important: Control of the town had given them crucial infrastructure to attack Iraqi and coalition targets.
The loss of Fallujah didn't cause the insurgency to collapse, but it did deprive the rebels of an indispensable sanctuary.
The coalition continued a high tempo of offensive operations. Although successful in many respects, these operations seemed like the "Whac-A-Mole" arcade game: towns were cleared of insurgents, but because of limited manpower, they could not be held. Insurgents returned once coalition forces moved on.
In February 2006, when Sunni extremists destroyed the Shiite mosque in Samarra, sectarian violence exploded, especially in Baghdad. American and Iraqi troops had to redeploy to confront the new threat, and in doing so, the gains that had been achieved against the Sunni insurgents were lost.
The new plan is a response to these changing conditions. The main reason for the so-called surge is to provide enough troops to provide security for Baghdad while regaining the initiative against the Sunni fighters in Anbar. It also recognizes that the Shiite militias causing most of the deaths in Baghdad must be neutralized.
It includes not only a military component but political and economic elements, as well. The adage - to defeat an insurgency, "win the hearts and minds" of the people - is true. But to do that, the people must have security. And to achieve security, it is often necessary to kill and capture the insurgents. Thus, military success is a necessary, if not sufficient, cause for defeating an insurgency.
This point is illustrated by an objective analysis of the Vietnam War. As Mark Moyar demonstrates in his remarkable new book, "Triumph Forsaken," the government of Ngo Dinh Diem had broken the communist insurgency in South Vietnam by 1960 by killing and capturing communist cadres in unprecedented number, leading many survivors to defect to the government's side. And in his book, "A Better War," Lewis Sorley shows how the US did the same in the late 1960s and 1970s.
Will Bush's approach work? This depends on at least three factors. The first is the adequacy of the force. Many commentators have called for troop increases of 40,000 to 50,000, but 20,000, which Bush called for, is the maximum number that can be culled from the current force. In any case, the key to success is not the number of troops but how they are used.
The second factor is the Iraqi government. Until now, the Shiite militias have been off limits. That has to change, and Bush put Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on notice that this is the case.
The third factor is Congress. Would the Democrats rather see Bush lose or the US win? Let us hope that the Demo-crats take the wise counsel of one of their own, Sen. Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, who reminded us the other day that the stark choice in Iraq is between victory and defeat.
• Mackubin Thomas Owens is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own
Against the Bush plan: Buchanan
Pat Buchanan argues that the president's plan leads inevitably toward disaster.
January 12, 2007
Still One More Card to Play
By Patrick Buchanan
Wednesday night, George Bush seemed to play his last card in the Iraq war. It was not impressive. Consider.
First, he warned of the awful consequences of a U.S. defeat: "Radical Islamic extremism would grow ... in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons."
Bush then warned of the awful consequences of the Baker commission proposal to "announce the phased withdrawal of our combat forces." "(T)o step back now would force a collapse of the Iraqi government, tear the country apart and result in mass killings on an unimaginable scale."
Twin those two warnings, and what is Bush saying?
His critics favor a course in Iraq that risks the fall of Baghdad, Iraq torn apart, slaughter of our friends, a surge in Islamic terror, the toppling of moderate Arab states, chaos in the Gulf, billions in oil revenue flowing to al-Qaida killers and a nuclear Iran.
And how do we avert so monstrous a calamity?
A "surge" of 21,500 troops, 15 percent of the U.S. forces already in Iraq, to pacify the capital. And even that troop commitment is "not open-ended."
This is just not credible. For, if the situation is as dire as Bush says and the potential disaster as horrific as he describes, the logical course would be to treble the number of troops in Iraq and commit to fight indefinitely.
How explain the disconnect? Is Bush absurdly exaggerating the consequences of a pullout?
No. U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East are indeed at risk because of the hubristic folly of our political elite in putting them there, when they launched this insane war.
But Bush cannot now commit to fight to victory, because the war is lost in the United States. Two-thirds of the American people are unwilling to make the sacrifices to save Iraq. Though they do not want a defeat and may not realize the consequences of a defeat, they are willing to risk a defeat, rather than continue to read of American kids being IED'ed to death and dismemberment in Baghdad and Anbar. The people want out and are saying to hell with the consequences.
That is the political realty that underlay the president's modest proposal of a "surge" to avert what he warns is a strategic disaster.
But Bush has to know the card he played is not going to save the pot into which he has plunged his legacy, the credibility of his country and America's standing as a superpower.
Which leads me to believe Bush has yet another card to play, an ace up his sleeve. What might that be?
Midway through his speech, almost as an aside, Bush made a pointed accusation at and issued a direct threat to -- Tehran.
To defend the "territorial integrity" of Iraq and stabilize "the region in the face of extremist challenge," Bush interjected, "begins with addressing Iran and Syria."
"These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq."
Now, any networks providing "advanced weaponry and training" to jihadists and insurgents are outside Iraq. Otherwise, they would have been neutralized by air strikes already.
So, where are they? Answer: inside Syria and Iran. And Bush says we are going to "seek out and destroy" these networks.
Which suggests to this writer that, while the "surge" is modest, Bush has in mind a different kind of escalation -- widening the war by attacking the source of instability in the region: Tehran.
"I recently ordered the deployment of an additional carrier strike group to the region," said Bush. "We will deploy ... Patriot air defense systems to reassure our friends and allies."
But there is no need for more carrier-based fighter-bombers in Iraq. And the insurgents have no missiles against which anyone would need Patriot missiles to defend. You only need Patriots if your target country has missiles with which to retaliate against you.
What Bush signaled in the clear Wednesday is that air strikes on Iranian "networks" are being planned. That would produce an Iranian response. That response would trigger U.S. strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, for which Israel and the neocons are howling.
And should this scenario play out, what would Hillary, Biden, Kerry, McCain, Giuliani, and even Pelosi and Obama do? Hail Bush as a Churchill. At first.
And Bush would have another legacy than a lost war in Iraq. Like Menachem Begin, only big-time, he would have his own Osirak.
Copyright 2007 Creators SyndicatePage
Printed from: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/still_one_more_card_to_play.html at January 12, 2007 - 08:10:24 PM CST
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January 12, 2007
Still One More Card to Play
By Patrick Buchanan
Wednesday night, George Bush seemed to play his last card in the Iraq war. It was not impressive. Consider.
First, he warned of the awful consequences of a U.S. defeat: "Radical Islamic extremism would grow ... in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons."
Bush then warned of the awful consequences of the Baker commission proposal to "announce the phased withdrawal of our combat forces." "(T)o step back now would force a collapse of the Iraqi government, tear the country apart and result in mass killings on an unimaginable scale."
Twin those two warnings, and what is Bush saying?
His critics favor a course in Iraq that risks the fall of Baghdad, Iraq torn apart, slaughter of our friends, a surge in Islamic terror, the toppling of moderate Arab states, chaos in the Gulf, billions in oil revenue flowing to al-Qaida killers and a nuclear Iran.
And how do we avert so monstrous a calamity?
A "surge" of 21,500 troops, 15 percent of the U.S. forces already in Iraq, to pacify the capital. And even that troop commitment is "not open-ended."
This is just not credible. For, if the situation is as dire as Bush says and the potential disaster as horrific as he describes, the logical course would be to treble the number of troops in Iraq and commit to fight indefinitely.
How explain the disconnect? Is Bush absurdly exaggerating the consequences of a pullout?
No. U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East are indeed at risk because of the hubristic folly of our political elite in putting them there, when they launched this insane war.
But Bush cannot now commit to fight to victory, because the war is lost in the United States. Two-thirds of the American people are unwilling to make the sacrifices to save Iraq. Though they do not want a defeat and may not realize the consequences of a defeat, they are willing to risk a defeat, rather than continue to read of American kids being IED'ed to death and dismemberment in Baghdad and Anbar. The people want out and are saying to hell with the consequences.
That is the political realty that underlay the president's modest proposal of a "surge" to avert what he warns is a strategic disaster.
But Bush has to know the card he played is not going to save the pot into which he has plunged his legacy, the credibility of his country and America's standing as a superpower.
Which leads me to believe Bush has yet another card to play, an ace up his sleeve. What might that be?
Midway through his speech, almost as an aside, Bush made a pointed accusation at and issued a direct threat to -- Tehran.
To defend the "territorial integrity" of Iraq and stabilize "the region in the face of extremist challenge," Bush interjected, "begins with addressing Iran and Syria."
"These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq."
Now, any networks providing "advanced weaponry and training" to jihadists and insurgents are outside Iraq. Otherwise, they would have been neutralized by air strikes already.
So, where are they? Answer: inside Syria and Iran. And Bush says we are going to "seek out and destroy" these networks.
Which suggests to this writer that, while the "surge" is modest, Bush has in mind a different kind of escalation -- widening the war by attacking the source of instability in the region: Tehran.
"I recently ordered the deployment of an additional carrier strike group to the region," said Bush. "We will deploy ... Patriot air defense systems to reassure our friends and allies."
But there is no need for more carrier-based fighter-bombers in Iraq. And the insurgents have no missiles against which anyone would need Patriot missiles to defend. You only need Patriots if your target country has missiles with which to retaliate against you.
What Bush signaled in the clear Wednesday is that air strikes on Iranian "networks" are being planned. That would produce an Iranian response. That response would trigger U.S. strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, for which Israel and the neocons are howling.
And should this scenario play out, what would Hillary, Biden, Kerry, McCain, Giuliani, and even Pelosi and Obama do? Hail Bush as a Churchill. At first.
And Bush would have another legacy than a lost war in Iraq. Like Menachem Begin, only big-time, he would have his own Osirak.
Copyright 2007 Creators SyndicatePage
Printed from: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/still_one_more_card_to_play.html at January 12, 2007 - 08:10:24 PM CST
_uacct = "UA-31527-1";
urchinTracker();
Giuliani, Gingrich: "Getting Iraq to Work"
Getting Iraq to Work
New York City's successes have lessons for Baghdad.
BY RUDY GIULIANI AND NEWT GINGRICH
Friday, January 12, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
The American mission in Iraq must succeed. Our goal--promoting a stable, accountable democracy in the heart of the Middle East--cannot be achieved by purely military means.
Iraqis need to establish a civil society. Without the support of mediating civic and social associations--the informal ties that bind us together--no government can long remain stable, and no cohesive nation can be maintained. To establish a civil society, Iraqis must rebuild their basic infrastructure. Iraqis must take control of their destiny by rebuilding houses, stores, schools, roads, highways, mosques and churches.
But the constant threat of violence, combined with a high unemployment rate estimated between 30% and 50%, fundamentally undermines that effort. This not only sustains the fertile breeding ground for terrorist recruiters but has the same corrosive effect as it would in any city--raising the likelihood of further violence, civic decay and a crippling sense of powerlessness.
A massive effort must be made to engage in a well organized plan to rebuild Iraq. The goal: an infrastructure to support and encourage a strong, stable civil society.
The week before Christmas, the Pentagon asked Congress to approve a supplemental $100 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, on top of the estimated $500 billion spent to date. The administration should direct a small percent of that amount to create an Iraqi Citizen Job Corps, along the lines of FDR's Civilian Conservation Corps during the Great Depression. The Job Corps can operate under the supervision of our military and with its protection. The Army Corps of Engineers might be particularly helpful in directing this effort. It will place our military in a constructive relationship with the Iraqis--both literally and figuratively.
Today, Iraq has almost 200 state-owned factories that have been abandoned by the governing authorities since the outbreak of war in 2003. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Paul A. Brinkley has led a team to 26 of those facilities, traveling far beyond the Green Zone to idled plants from Fallujah to Ramadi. Mr. Brinkley believes that under Department of Defense leadership, at least 10 of these facilities could be re-opened almost immediately, putting more than 10,000 Iraqis to work within weeks. This should be done without delay--and it is only the beginning.
The wages that these thousands of gainfully employed workers receive will be used to purchase goods and services that will employ other Iraqis. Those goods and services must be produced by still other Iraqis. These are the first steps in creating the requisite conditions of a stable functioning economy and the best hope of displacing retribution and violence with hope and opportunity.
We must try to achieve constructive and compassionate goals through conservative means--jump starting civic improvement and the individual work ethic in Iraq, without creating permanent subsidies. The goal is to get more Iraqis working, especially young males, who are most susceptible to the terrorist and warlord recruiters.
There are many lessons from the successful welfare reforms in New York City that can be readily applied in Iraq. In the early 1990s, New York City suffered an average of 2,000 murders a year while more than 1.1 million people--one out of every seven New Yorkers--were unemployed and on welfare. Too many neighborhoods were pervaded by a sense of hopelessness that came from a combination of high crime, high unemployment and despair. "Workfare" proved an excellent method to change this destructive decades-long paradigm.
It required able-bodied welfare recipients to work 20 hours a week in exchange for their benefits. In the process, we reasserted the value of the social contract, which says that for every right there is a responsibility, for every benefit an obligation.
As many as 37,000 people participated at a single time, working in the neighborhoods that most needed their help, cleaning up streets with the Sanitation Department, removing graffiti from schools and government buildings, or helping to beautify public spaces in the Parks Department.
More than 250,000 individuals went through our Workfare program between 1994 and 2001, and their effort helped to visibly improve the quality of life in New York City. Many of them moved on to permanent employment. This change from welfare to work did as much as the New York Police Department Compstat program to keep reducing crime. A similar model can work in Iraq.
There is an opportunity not only to increase employment by rebuilding roads, houses, schools and government buildings, but also to engage the Iraqi people to participate in laying the foundation for a civil and prosperous society.
The population of Iraq is roughly 30 million with a pre-war median annual income equivalent to $700. Subsidizing unemployed Iraqis with a meaningful wage in exchange for meaningful work rebuilding their society is well within the means of the U.S. and its allies.
The entire effort will help stabilize and grow the Iraqi economy. It should be open to all willing Iraqis--Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds--as a means of helping to create a common culture through shared participation in work projects to rebuild and take ownership of their nation.
One word of caution: The program should be overseen by the U.S. military, not private contractors, to avoid unnecessary delays in deployment or accusations of cronyism in the bidding process. Our military will still be devoted to its primary role of hunting down terrorists and patrolling the streets, but administering a jobs program would be a direct extension of their effort to secure law and order. After the program has been started and becomes successful, it can be transferred to a civilian authority within the Iraqi government.
The creation of an Iraqi Citizen Job Corps will help expedite the establishment of a more stable civil society and improve the growing Iraqi economy through the transforming power of an honest day's work.
Mr. Giuliani is the former mayor of New York City.
Mr. Gingrich is a former speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives.
New York City's successes have lessons for Baghdad.
BY RUDY GIULIANI AND NEWT GINGRICH
Friday, January 12, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
The American mission in Iraq must succeed. Our goal--promoting a stable, accountable democracy in the heart of the Middle East--cannot be achieved by purely military means.
Iraqis need to establish a civil society. Without the support of mediating civic and social associations--the informal ties that bind us together--no government can long remain stable, and no cohesive nation can be maintained. To establish a civil society, Iraqis must rebuild their basic infrastructure. Iraqis must take control of their destiny by rebuilding houses, stores, schools, roads, highways, mosques and churches.
But the constant threat of violence, combined with a high unemployment rate estimated between 30% and 50%, fundamentally undermines that effort. This not only sustains the fertile breeding ground for terrorist recruiters but has the same corrosive effect as it would in any city--raising the likelihood of further violence, civic decay and a crippling sense of powerlessness.
A massive effort must be made to engage in a well organized plan to rebuild Iraq. The goal: an infrastructure to support and encourage a strong, stable civil society.
The week before Christmas, the Pentagon asked Congress to approve a supplemental $100 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, on top of the estimated $500 billion spent to date. The administration should direct a small percent of that amount to create an Iraqi Citizen Job Corps, along the lines of FDR's Civilian Conservation Corps during the Great Depression. The Job Corps can operate under the supervision of our military and with its protection. The Army Corps of Engineers might be particularly helpful in directing this effort. It will place our military in a constructive relationship with the Iraqis--both literally and figuratively.
Today, Iraq has almost 200 state-owned factories that have been abandoned by the governing authorities since the outbreak of war in 2003. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Paul A. Brinkley has led a team to 26 of those facilities, traveling far beyond the Green Zone to idled plants from Fallujah to Ramadi. Mr. Brinkley believes that under Department of Defense leadership, at least 10 of these facilities could be re-opened almost immediately, putting more than 10,000 Iraqis to work within weeks. This should be done without delay--and it is only the beginning.
The wages that these thousands of gainfully employed workers receive will be used to purchase goods and services that will employ other Iraqis. Those goods and services must be produced by still other Iraqis. These are the first steps in creating the requisite conditions of a stable functioning economy and the best hope of displacing retribution and violence with hope and opportunity.
We must try to achieve constructive and compassionate goals through conservative means--jump starting civic improvement and the individual work ethic in Iraq, without creating permanent subsidies. The goal is to get more Iraqis working, especially young males, who are most susceptible to the terrorist and warlord recruiters.
There are many lessons from the successful welfare reforms in New York City that can be readily applied in Iraq. In the early 1990s, New York City suffered an average of 2,000 murders a year while more than 1.1 million people--one out of every seven New Yorkers--were unemployed and on welfare. Too many neighborhoods were pervaded by a sense of hopelessness that came from a combination of high crime, high unemployment and despair. "Workfare" proved an excellent method to change this destructive decades-long paradigm.
It required able-bodied welfare recipients to work 20 hours a week in exchange for their benefits. In the process, we reasserted the value of the social contract, which says that for every right there is a responsibility, for every benefit an obligation.
As many as 37,000 people participated at a single time, working in the neighborhoods that most needed their help, cleaning up streets with the Sanitation Department, removing graffiti from schools and government buildings, or helping to beautify public spaces in the Parks Department.
More than 250,000 individuals went through our Workfare program between 1994 and 2001, and their effort helped to visibly improve the quality of life in New York City. Many of them moved on to permanent employment. This change from welfare to work did as much as the New York Police Department Compstat program to keep reducing crime. A similar model can work in Iraq.
There is an opportunity not only to increase employment by rebuilding roads, houses, schools and government buildings, but also to engage the Iraqi people to participate in laying the foundation for a civil and prosperous society.
The population of Iraq is roughly 30 million with a pre-war median annual income equivalent to $700. Subsidizing unemployed Iraqis with a meaningful wage in exchange for meaningful work rebuilding their society is well within the means of the U.S. and its allies.
The entire effort will help stabilize and grow the Iraqi economy. It should be open to all willing Iraqis--Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds--as a means of helping to create a common culture through shared participation in work projects to rebuild and take ownership of their nation.
One word of caution: The program should be overseen by the U.S. military, not private contractors, to avoid unnecessary delays in deployment or accusations of cronyism in the bidding process. Our military will still be devoted to its primary role of hunting down terrorists and patrolling the streets, but administering a jobs program would be a direct extension of their effort to secure law and order. After the program has been started and becomes successful, it can be transferred to a civilian authority within the Iraqi government.
The creation of an Iraqi Citizen Job Corps will help expedite the establishment of a more stable civil society and improve the growing Iraqi economy through the transforming power of an honest day's work.
Mr. Giuliani is the former mayor of New York City.
Mr. Gingrich is a former speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives.
Wednesday, January 10, 2007
Barone: "Bitter Clash Coming Over Iraq"
Barone is right on all points here.
A Bitter Clash is Coming Over Iraq
By Michael Barone
Cynics surely found the words of good will exchanged by the new speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, and the new House minority leader, John Boehner, at the opening session of the new Congress to be hypocritical and insincere. The two leaders are grizzled veteran pols, after all, who have not been known to be on close, much less candid, terms with each other over the years. But I know them both, and I believe they were speaking genuinely from the heart.
The passage of power from one political party to another is an awesome thing for anyone who knows much history, indeed for anyone who clicks his remote control onto cable news. It is not the norm in human history. And the swearing in of a 110th Congress -- 110th! -- is part of a living chain that links us to George Washington and to James Madison, who was sworn in as a member of the House in the First Congress, 218 years ago.
Which isn't to say that there isn't going to be some bitter conflict between the new Democratic Congress and George W. Bush in months ahead. That's not out of line with tradition, either: Madison was opposing Washington's major initiatives long before the First Congress adjourned.
In that case, the conflict occurred over Alexander Hamilton's economic policies. In this case, the conflict seems likely to occur over what we should do next in Iraq.
Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid have made it clear that they take the Democratic victory last November as a mandate for withdrawal from Iraq. That's a point you could argue with -- you could make a case from the polls that what voters want most of all is victory and success. But Pelosi and Reid and almost all of their Democratic colleagues are sincere in their view, which is at the least plausible.
George W. Bush, from all accounts, seems to take a different view. He evidently sees the November result as a verdict of dissatisfaction with unsuccess and lack of victory, and so is promising a "new way forward." He has been prompted by his party's "thumpin'" to change the way he manages.
Since the success of the major military operations in May 2003, he has delegated power to appointees he trusts and has mostly ratified their plans. Far from micromanaging the military, he and former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld seem to have approved pretty much everything that Centcom head Gen. John Abizaid and the rotating military commanders in Iraq have proposed. They seem not to have taken the advice of military historian Eliot Cohen in his book "Supreme Command" that wartime commanders in chief should constantly question, probe, prod and, yes, even overrule their generals, as Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben Gurion did.
Now it looks like Bush is doing something like that. Rumsfeld's resignation was announced the day after the election; Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte has been moved over to State; Abizaid's retirement has been announced; and Gen. George Casey, the on-the-ground commander in Iraq, is being moved out early. Bush is reported to be planning a "surge" of additional troops into Iraq to establish order in Baghdad and Anbar province. Clearly, the president is changing tactics and maybe even strategy.
Many Democrats are calling this "escalation" and are swearing they'll oppose it. For those who see Iraq through the prism of Vietnam, a surge is something like Richard Nixon's invasion of Cambodia, an intensification of a war that never seems likely to go away.
I have been of the view that the Democratic Congress would not use its legislative powers to bar an increase in troop levels, for fear they would be seen as not supporting the troops already there (and for fear they couldn't get majorities on the floor), and I still think that's unlikely.
There's a danger in being seen as promoting an American defeat. But the left wing of the Democratic Party will be calling loudly for defunding the war, and as we saw last week, in a jarring episode during the festivities, Cindy Sheehan can outshout the Democratic leadership.
I think we're going to see a very loud and bitter clash, one that will contrast vividly with the graceful words of Pelosi and Boehner on opening day. One side wants American victory and success, though it cannot promise that they are certain; the other wants only exit, without regard to the consequences. The 110th Congress will be no more devoid of controversy and angry partisanship than the First.
Copyright 2007 Creators Syndicate
A Bitter Clash is Coming Over Iraq
By Michael Barone
Cynics surely found the words of good will exchanged by the new speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, and the new House minority leader, John Boehner, at the opening session of the new Congress to be hypocritical and insincere. The two leaders are grizzled veteran pols, after all, who have not been known to be on close, much less candid, terms with each other over the years. But I know them both, and I believe they were speaking genuinely from the heart.
The passage of power from one political party to another is an awesome thing for anyone who knows much history, indeed for anyone who clicks his remote control onto cable news. It is not the norm in human history. And the swearing in of a 110th Congress -- 110th! -- is part of a living chain that links us to George Washington and to James Madison, who was sworn in as a member of the House in the First Congress, 218 years ago.
Which isn't to say that there isn't going to be some bitter conflict between the new Democratic Congress and George W. Bush in months ahead. That's not out of line with tradition, either: Madison was opposing Washington's major initiatives long before the First Congress adjourned.
In that case, the conflict occurred over Alexander Hamilton's economic policies. In this case, the conflict seems likely to occur over what we should do next in Iraq.
Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid have made it clear that they take the Democratic victory last November as a mandate for withdrawal from Iraq. That's a point you could argue with -- you could make a case from the polls that what voters want most of all is victory and success. But Pelosi and Reid and almost all of their Democratic colleagues are sincere in their view, which is at the least plausible.
George W. Bush, from all accounts, seems to take a different view. He evidently sees the November result as a verdict of dissatisfaction with unsuccess and lack of victory, and so is promising a "new way forward." He has been prompted by his party's "thumpin'" to change the way he manages.
Since the success of the major military operations in May 2003, he has delegated power to appointees he trusts and has mostly ratified their plans. Far from micromanaging the military, he and former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld seem to have approved pretty much everything that Centcom head Gen. John Abizaid and the rotating military commanders in Iraq have proposed. They seem not to have taken the advice of military historian Eliot Cohen in his book "Supreme Command" that wartime commanders in chief should constantly question, probe, prod and, yes, even overrule their generals, as Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben Gurion did.
Now it looks like Bush is doing something like that. Rumsfeld's resignation was announced the day after the election; Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte has been moved over to State; Abizaid's retirement has been announced; and Gen. George Casey, the on-the-ground commander in Iraq, is being moved out early. Bush is reported to be planning a "surge" of additional troops into Iraq to establish order in Baghdad and Anbar province. Clearly, the president is changing tactics and maybe even strategy.
Many Democrats are calling this "escalation" and are swearing they'll oppose it. For those who see Iraq through the prism of Vietnam, a surge is something like Richard Nixon's invasion of Cambodia, an intensification of a war that never seems likely to go away.
I have been of the view that the Democratic Congress would not use its legislative powers to bar an increase in troop levels, for fear they would be seen as not supporting the troops already there (and for fear they couldn't get majorities on the floor), and I still think that's unlikely.
There's a danger in being seen as promoting an American defeat. But the left wing of the Democratic Party will be calling loudly for defunding the war, and as we saw last week, in a jarring episode during the festivities, Cindy Sheehan can outshout the Democratic leadership.
I think we're going to see a very loud and bitter clash, one that will contrast vividly with the graceful words of Pelosi and Boehner on opening day. One side wants American victory and success, though it cannot promise that they are certain; the other wants only exit, without regard to the consequences. The 110th Congress will be no more devoid of controversy and angry partisanship than the First.
Copyright 2007 Creators Syndicate
Monday, January 1, 2007
"Only stupid, sadistic dictators hang… and Saddam was both"
Harvard history prof Niall Ferguson pens an interesting postmortem of Saddam. Several passages are worth quoting:
"Only a minority of modern dictators have been executed for their crimes. The most bloodthirsty of all, Stalin and Mao, died in full possession of their powers, if not their faculties. Franco pulled off the same trick. Hitler cheated the hangman with a bullet in the bunker. Pol Pot lost power, but was never brought to justice and died in his bed, as did Idi Amin.
Slobodan Milosevic stood trial for his crimes, but died of a heart attack in March with 50 hours of testimony still to be heard. Augusto Pinochet, too, suffered the indignity of arrest; three weeks ago he also expired naturally before prosecution could even begin. Suharto is another fallen dictator who has avoided standing trial on the grounds of ill health. And let's not forget that dwindling band of dictators who are still alive and in power: Fidel Castro, Robert Mugabe and Muammar Gaddafi.
Dictators, by definition, have absolute power. For a dictator to end his life hanging from a rope, or facing a firing squad, therefore requires a rather rare combination of wickedness and stupidity: enough of the former to incur the hatred of his countrymen, enough of the latter to take on armies mightier than his own. Both these qualities Saddam Hussein possessed in abundance. That is why, in the wake of his execution at dawn yesterday morning, he deserves to be remembered as the Mussolini of Mesopotamia — if not the Ceausescu of Baghdad."
"Saddam shared more than a few traits with his hero Stalin. Like Stalin, his origins were humble (he was a shepherd's son from Tikrit). Like Stalin, he was attracted as much to nationalism as to socialism, which made the Ba'ath Party his natural political home. Like Stalin, he had no fear of revolutionary violence; indeed, he was wounded in the leg during an abortive Ba'athist rising in 1959. And, like Stalin, he rose through the party ranks until powerful enough to establish a ruthless dictatorship."
"The People's Army — the military wing of the Ba'ath Party — and the Mukhabarat (Department of Intelligence) were his chosen instruments for terrorising real and imagined opponents. The facade of legitimacy was provided by a classic personality cult. The gargantuan statues, the garish murals, the bombastic propaganda: all were taken from the 1930s Soviet playbook.
Yet Stalin would never have been as stupid as Saddam was — to pit his own army not once but twice against the most powerful military in the world."
"The decline and fall of Saddam Hussein has been too tawdry to pass muster as a Shakespearian tragedy. Its protagonist was too crass a character, more Don Corleone than Coriolanus. This play has been part Marlowe, part Brecht: a cross between The Massacre at Paris and The Threepenny Opera. Like the Duc de Guise in Marlowe's bloodthirsty drama, Saddam was responsible for more than enough mass murder to justify his own violent end. Unlike Macheath in Brecht's musical, Saddam was not pardoned in the last minute before his execution, but his death seems to pose a version of Brecht's old question: "Who is the bigger criminal: he who robs a bank, or he who founds one?"
"The dictator is dead, hoist by the petard of his own Stalinist cruelty and Mussolini-like miscalculation. But Iraq's road towards democratic stability has a very long way still to run. If every milestone is an execution, it will be a hellish highway indeed."
"Only a minority of modern dictators have been executed for their crimes. The most bloodthirsty of all, Stalin and Mao, died in full possession of their powers, if not their faculties. Franco pulled off the same trick. Hitler cheated the hangman with a bullet in the bunker. Pol Pot lost power, but was never brought to justice and died in his bed, as did Idi Amin.
Slobodan Milosevic stood trial for his crimes, but died of a heart attack in March with 50 hours of testimony still to be heard. Augusto Pinochet, too, suffered the indignity of arrest; three weeks ago he also expired naturally before prosecution could even begin. Suharto is another fallen dictator who has avoided standing trial on the grounds of ill health. And let's not forget that dwindling band of dictators who are still alive and in power: Fidel Castro, Robert Mugabe and Muammar Gaddafi.
Dictators, by definition, have absolute power. For a dictator to end his life hanging from a rope, or facing a firing squad, therefore requires a rather rare combination of wickedness and stupidity: enough of the former to incur the hatred of his countrymen, enough of the latter to take on armies mightier than his own. Both these qualities Saddam Hussein possessed in abundance. That is why, in the wake of his execution at dawn yesterday morning, he deserves to be remembered as the Mussolini of Mesopotamia — if not the Ceausescu of Baghdad."
"Saddam shared more than a few traits with his hero Stalin. Like Stalin, his origins were humble (he was a shepherd's son from Tikrit). Like Stalin, he was attracted as much to nationalism as to socialism, which made the Ba'ath Party his natural political home. Like Stalin, he had no fear of revolutionary violence; indeed, he was wounded in the leg during an abortive Ba'athist rising in 1959. And, like Stalin, he rose through the party ranks until powerful enough to establish a ruthless dictatorship."
"The People's Army — the military wing of the Ba'ath Party — and the Mukhabarat (Department of Intelligence) were his chosen instruments for terrorising real and imagined opponents. The facade of legitimacy was provided by a classic personality cult. The gargantuan statues, the garish murals, the bombastic propaganda: all were taken from the 1930s Soviet playbook.
Yet Stalin would never have been as stupid as Saddam was — to pit his own army not once but twice against the most powerful military in the world."
"The decline and fall of Saddam Hussein has been too tawdry to pass muster as a Shakespearian tragedy. Its protagonist was too crass a character, more Don Corleone than Coriolanus. This play has been part Marlowe, part Brecht: a cross between The Massacre at Paris and The Threepenny Opera. Like the Duc de Guise in Marlowe's bloodthirsty drama, Saddam was responsible for more than enough mass murder to justify his own violent end. Unlike Macheath in Brecht's musical, Saddam was not pardoned in the last minute before his execution, but his death seems to pose a version of Brecht's old question: "Who is the bigger criminal: he who robs a bank, or he who founds one?"
"The dictator is dead, hoist by the petard of his own Stalinist cruelty and Mussolini-like miscalculation. But Iraq's road towards democratic stability has a very long way still to run. If every milestone is an execution, it will be a hellish highway indeed."
Friday, December 29, 2006
Saddam Hussein Executed
Just crossing many wires within the last half hour. Saddam dead by hanging at approximately 9:05 pm (CT).
From the BBC:
Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has been executed by hanging at an unspecified location, reports say.
Iraqi TV said the execution took place just before 0600 local time (0300GMT). It was witnessed by a doctor, lawyer and officials. It was also filmed.
US troops and Iraqi security forces are on high alert for any violent backlash.
Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court on 5 November after a year-long trial over the 1982 killings of 148 Shias in the town Dujail.
From the BBC:
Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has been executed by hanging at an unspecified location, reports say.
Iraqi TV said the execution took place just before 0600 local time (0300GMT). It was witnessed by a doctor, lawyer and officials. It was also filmed.
US troops and Iraqi security forces are on high alert for any violent backlash.
Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court on 5 November after a year-long trial over the 1982 killings of 148 Shias in the town Dujail.
1 PM (CT) Report: Saddam may hang "within hours"
Cue the Styx song "Renegade", somebody?
Saddam may hang within hours: senior Iraqi source
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Saddam Hussein could be hanged within hours, a senior Iraqi source told Reuters on Friday after Saddam's lawyer said U.S. forces had handed over the former president to Iraqi authorities for execution.
"Things have changed in the past three hours. There were some issues ... and now that is resolved so it seems it's possible he may be hanged tonight," the source, who is in a senior position of authority, said after a day of confusion.
Saddam may hang within hours: senior Iraqi source
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Saddam Hussein could be hanged within hours, a senior Iraqi source told Reuters on Friday after Saddam's lawyer said U.S. forces had handed over the former president to Iraqi authorities for execution.
"Things have changed in the past three hours. There were some issues ... and now that is resolved so it seems it's possible he may be hanged tonight," the source, who is in a senior position of authority, said after a day of confusion.
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